[Occasionally in theological literature you will find reference to “Marsh’s Dictum” regarding typology. This dictum is the idea that valid Biblical types are limited to those which are explicitly cited as such in the New Testament. I hope to analyze this dictum in a future article. In the meanwhile, I thought it would be valuable to here make accessible the entire lecture on types from Herbert Marsh in 1813. I’ve made bold the most notable sections. – DJD, 4/17/2025]
A Course of Lectures Containing a Description And Systematic Arrangement of the Several Branches of Divinity Accompanied With An Account Both of the Principal Authors, and of the Progress, Which Has Been Made at Different Periods in Theological Learning.
By Herbert Marsh, D.D. F.R.S.
Part III On the Interpretation of the Bible
Cambridge, 1813.
Lecture XVIII.
WHEN the early Fathers had adopted the mode of allegorical interpretation, which was described a the end of the last Lecture, they applied it to the defence of the Sacred Writings agains the objections of he Greek Philosophers. But however well-intentioned that application might have been, it was ill calculated to serve the cause of Christianity. For, instead of confuting their adversaries by an argumentum ad judicium, they only silenced their adversaries by a retort of the argumentum ad hominem. Thus, when Celsus, the Epicurean philosopher, had objected to the Mosaic account of the Creation, the Temptation, and the Fall of Man, the answer of Origen, in his treatise against Celsus, was better adapted to a defeat of his immediate opponent, than to a permanent defence of the Bible. It was urged by Origen, that the narratives, to which Celsus had objected, should be explained allegorically: and he argued, that Celsus could not consistently reject this mode of interpretation, because it was employed by the Greek philosophers themselves. But, though truth is frequently conveyed in the form of an Allegory, the truth, which is thus conveyed, is moral, not historic truth. The narrative, which imparts the Moral, is itself fictitious. If therefore a narrative, professedly historical, be treated as a narrative purely allegorical, the history itself is thereby abandoned. That some moral inference may still be drawn from it, is nothing to the purpose. Moral inferences are drawn from professed fables, which are themselves a kind of allegory. But their value is confined entirely to the application of them; whereas historic facts are recorded for their own sakes, and independently of any moral use, which may afterwards by made of them.
If we ascribe then to the character of allegory to an historical narrative, we defeat the very purpose, for which the facts, contained in it, were recorded. Besides, if this treatment of an historical narrative is admissible in one case, it is admissible in others: and thus all history, both sacred and profane, may be diverted from its original intent. For nothing is more easy, than such a mode of treatment. We have only to look for some sort of resemblance between the fact, to which allegorical interpretation shall be applied, and some other fact (whether near of remote, is of little consequence), and we obtain at once, upon these principles, the immediate and the ultimate representation of an Allegory; we have at once an allegorical, instead of an historical narrative. In this manner was the history of our Savior and the twelve Apostles converted a few years ago by a French writer into a mere Allegory: and persons, whose existence is established by the strongest of all possible evidence, were transformed into ideal representations of the Sun and the twelve signs of the Zodiac. By a similar process were the miracles of our Savior converted into Allegories, in the former part of the last century, by a member of this very University. Indeed this writer imagined, that he had not only the example of the Fathers, but the example also of St. Paul in his favour. And since, according to the words of our authorised version, St. Paul had made an Allegory of one fact, he thought himself at liberty to make an Allegory of another. That St. Paul did not apply the title of Allegory to any historic fact, that he afforded not even a pretext for this mode of allegorical interpretation, was fully proved in the Last Lecture. But it would be difficult, if not impossible to vindicate the conduct of the Fathers. Their mode of allegorizing Scripture was of a very different description from that, which was applied by St. Paul. For instead of applying historical facts, as types of other facts, by which the historical verity is preserved, they often applied them in such a manner, that the historical verity was destroyed. They often explained historical facts, as if real existence no more attached to them, than to the immediate representation of an Allegory.
We have reason therefore to complain, that the early Fathers have afforded by their own conduct a pretext to modern unbelievers for such a mode of allegorical interpretation. It is true, that a mode, which is indefensible in itself, can derive no real support from the practice of those, to whom authority no more attaches, than to any modern interpreter. And whatever confidence the Church of Rome may repose in the expositions of her Fathers, we may hence learn, that such confidence is ill bestowed. Indeed the early Fathers, by their injudicious conduct in the interpretation of the Bible, not only affected many parts of its history, but placed the Bible itself in very false and injurious light. Though they silenced, by the aid of Allegory, their immediate opponents, who argued on the same principles, yet the very circumstance, that principles applied to the defence of the Heathen mythology, were applied also to the defence of the Bible, could produce no other effect, that that of degrading the latter to the level of the former. When a passage of the Bible, conveying professedly an historical fact, was defended against the objections of the Heathens by resolving that passage into a mere Allegory, the veil, which was thus drawn over it, served only to present it in the same dress, in which the Heathens exhibited the fables of their Gods. The latter indeed had some excuse for their allegorical interpretations; they had reason for concealing under the veil of Allegory their ludicrous and indecorous legends. Hence Arnobius, in his treatise adverses Gentes, addressed himself to a Heathen in the following manner: Istae omnes historiae, quae tibi turpes videntur, atque ad labem pertinere divinam, mysteria in se continent sancta, rationes miras atque altas, nec quas facile quivis possit ingenii vivacitate pernoscere. Neque enim quod scriptum est atque in prima est positum verborum fronte, id significatur et dicitur, sed allegoricis sensibus, et subditivis intelliguntur omnia illa Secretics.
But that Christian Commentators should in like manner have sought for allegorical senses and hidden meanings in the Bible, where the Sacred Writers have recorded the plain and simple words of Truth, of Truth which has no deformity to hide, and needs not the veil of Allegory, affords equal matter of surprise and of regret.
Nor is this the only evil, which has arisen from such a treatment of Scripture. If the literal or grammatical meaning of a passage may be exchanged at pleasure for an allegorical meaning, the meaning of Scripture will be involved in perfect ambiguity: it will assume as many different forms, as the fancies of interpreters are multifarious. In grammatical interpretation, which is an interpretation of words, there are certain rules of interpretation, from which we cannot depart. But allegorical interpretation, which is interpretation of things, is subjected to neither rule nor limit. As soon as an interpreter has learnt, what things are literally signified by the words of a passage, he has nothing else to do, than to let loose his imagination for the discovery of some other things, which may resemble the things literally signified, and then those other things will at once be allegorically signified. And since the same thing may to various interpreters suggest various resemblances, the same passage may have as many allegorical meanings, as there are persons, who undertake its interpretation. Hence Arnobius, in continuation of this subject, observes, Potest alius aliud, et argutius fingere, et veri cum similitudine suspicari. Potest aliud tertius; potest aliud quartus: atque, ut se tulerint ingeniorum opinantium qualitates, ita singulae res possunt infinitis interpretationibus explicari. Cum enim e rebus occlusis omnis ista, quae diciture Allegoria, sumatur, nec habeat finem certum, in quo rei, quae diciture, sit fix atque immota sententia, unicuique liberum est in id, quo velit, attrahere lectionem, et affirmare id positum, in quod eum sua suspicio, et conjectura opinabilis duxerit.
But, notwithstanding the numerous objections, to which this mode of interpretation is exposed, it has prevailed, more or less, in almost every age of Christianity. Indeed the very causes, which should have led to the rejection of it, are the causes which have operated in its favour. For though a mode of interpretation, which may be applied to any purpose, is really fit no for purpose, yet, if an interpreter has no other means of attaining his purpose, yet, if an interpreter has no other means of attaining his purpose, he finds it difficult to withstand the temptation of employing what is always at hand for every purpose. The use which which was made of it by the early Fathers, and the advantage taken of their injudicious conduct, have been already explained. But allegorical interpretation, when once adopted, was not long confined to the controversies between the Greek Fathers and the Greek philosophers. It was soon discovered to be equally useful for controversy of every description. And hence, if one opinion was supported by grammatical interpretation, a different opinion could be easily supported by allegorical interpretation. But beside the motive of utility, there was something attractive in the thing itself. The imagination, delighting in allegory, is easily charmed into allegorical interpretation, while the dryness of grammatical interpretation is, in an equal degree, an objection of its aversion. The former was recommended also by the facility of its application, while the exercise of the latter required, on the part of the interpreter, at least some share of knowledge and judgment. It is no wonder therefore, that in proportion as learning declined, the passion for allegorical interpretation increased. And the use of grammatical interpretation having been proportionally diminished in the Church of Rome by the substitution of an authorised version for the original Scriptures, there at length arose, in the darkness of the middle ages, a race of Fanatics who rejected grammatical interpretation altogether. They were distinguished in the twelfth century by the appellation of the Mystics, from their mystical mode of interpreting Scripture. These Mystics had an utter contempt for human reason and human learning; they supposed themselves especially guided by the Spirit; and hence they compensated, by a king of spiritual interpretation, for that grammatical interpretation, which they had never learnt. At the same time, the Latin version of the New Testament, in the absence of the Greek original, supplied them with an argument for the rejection of literal or grammatical interpretation, and the adoption of spiritual or allegorical interpretation, which the original itself does not supply. They appealed namely to that passage in St. Paul’s Second Epistle to the Corinthians, which in the Latin Vulgate is translated ‘litera occidit, spiritus autem vivificat;’ and in our own authorised version, ‘the letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life.’ In this passage, the Mystics imagined that St. Paul was drawing a parallel between two different kinds of interpretation. Construing therefore ‘litera’ by ‘literal interpretation,’ and ‘spiritus’ by ‘spiritual interpretation,’ they inferred, that the Apostle had condemned the former, and recommended the exclusive employment of the latter. Now the Apostle, according to his own words, was drawing a parallel of a totally different description: a parallel, which had no concern whatever with interpretation. He was drawing a parallel between the Law of Moses and the Gospel of Christ.
The former does not afford the means of salvation: the latter does afford the means of salvation. This and this only, is what St. Paul meant, when he said, that the one killeth, and the other giveth life. It is true that he applied the term gramma to the former, the term pneuma to the latter. But then he added explanations of those terms, which remove all ambiguity. The Law of Moses he called gramma, as being diakonia en grammasi, as be diakovia entetupomena ev lithois. The Gospel of Christ he called pneuma, as being diakonia tour pneumatos en doxa. Now, as these explanations are not only Greek explanation, but also Greek explanations of Greek terms, they are absolutely incapable of being transfused into any version. They can be understood only, with reference to the words of the original. It is therefore impossible, that any one who expounds this passage from the words of a translation should expound it in the sense of the Author. But as the Mystics, like other members of the Church of Rome, expounded from an authorised version, they fell into an error, which a knowledge of the original would have prevented. They fell into the error of supposing, that literal or grammatical exposition not only might be, but ought to be discarded. And hence they acquired such a contempt for everything not spiritual or allegorical, that the plain and literal meaning of a passage was regarded as a sort of husk, or chaff, fit only for the carnally-minded, and not suited to the taste of the godly.
But whatever absurdities might result from their interpreting the New Testament without a knowledge of Greek, the Mystics were in no danger of observing them. And in other respects the use of a translation was really advantageous. The could more easily bend it to their particular purpose: for, in the interpretation of Scripture the words of a translation are always more pliant, than the words of the original. The obscurity, in which the sense of Scripture was thus involved, so far from being thought injurious, afforded them both pleasure and protection. Mystical interpreters delight in obscurity: obscurity is their proper element. If a passage is obscure in itself, they are in less danger of being thwarted by a literal meaning. If they make it obscure, they obtain this advantage, that the greater the obstacles, which they can oppose to the judgment, the greater is the scope for the exercise of the fancy. This fancy has been equally indulged by the Mystics of every age; and however eccentric we may think the expositions displayed in the Arca mystica, or Mystical Ark, of Richard of St. Victor, who flourished in the twelfth century, they have been fully equalled by the mystical exposition of these latter times. Nor is it by any means a matter of astonishment, that spiritual interpretation should recommend itself to our modern practitioners. No grammatical analysis, no knowledge of Hebrew or Greek, no knowledge of antiquity, no knowledge of the situation and circumstances, either of the author, or of his original readers, is necessary for this purpose. Such knowledge is wanted only for grammatical interpretation. It is wanted only, when the words, which we interpret, are destined to performed the office, for which they were originally intended. It is wanted only, when the words, which we interpret, are considered, as signs to the reader of what was thought by the author. But the expounder, who regards them as passive instruments disposable at his own will, and who employs them, as machines for the conveyance of his own thoughts, is freed at once from the shackles, which bind the grammatical interpreter, and is exempted from all other wants, than merely that of knowing what is best adapted to his own purpose.
Men, who are little versed in the history of biblical interpretation, and have never witnessed the wonders, that are done by the aid of allegory, will be surprised perhaps to hear, that the Supremacy of the Pope has been discovered in the first chapter of Genesis. The interpreter, who made this discovery, was himself a sovereign pontiff, and one, who exercised that supremacy with unlimited sway. It was Pope Innocent the Third; the same, who excommunicated King John of England, and who threatened even the Emperor of Constantinople. For this purpose he addressed to him a Latin Epistle, in which he quoted from the first chapter of Genesis the passage relating to the two great lights, the greater light to rule the day, and the lesser light to rule the night. By these two lights, said he, are meant the office of Pope and the office of King; by the greater light is meant the former office, by the lesser light the latter office; so that, as the light, which rules the day, is superior to the light, which rules the night, the dignity of Pope is superior to the dignity of King. Lest this interpretation should appear incredible, I will give the words of the original Epistle. Pope Innocent III. Then, having quoted from the Latin Vulgate, Fecit duo luminaria magna, luminare majus, ut proeesset diei, et luminare minus, ut proeesset notci, subjoined the follower interpretation; Id est, duas dignitates instituit, quae sunt, Pontificalis Auctoritas, et, Regalis Majestas. Sed illa, quae proeest diebus, id est spiritualibus, major est altera, quae noctibus, id est, carnalibus; ut quanta est inter Solem et Lunam, tanta inter Pontifices et Reges, differentia cognoscatur. Now this allegorical interpretation, absurd as it may appear, is not more absurd, than many, which are vented in the present age. It is however absurd enough; for the comparison is not only unwarranted, but is an actual inversion of the truth. The things spiritual, and the things carnal, to which reference is here made, should have changed their position; the luminaries should have been transposed. For spiritual dominion, whether exercised by the Pope, or by those who resemble him, is not a power, that rules the day, but a power, that rules the night.
Let us now consider that kind of allegorical interpretation, which consists in the application of things, recorded in the Old Testament, to similar things recorded in the New Testament. That kind may be properly called typical interpretation; for it is an application of types to their antitypes. It is warranted by the authority of the Sacred writers themselves. But they have warranted the use of it only to a certain extent; and, if we transgress the limits, which they have prescribed we shall be in perpetual danger of taking things for what they were not designed to be. To constitute one thing the type of another, as the term is generally understood in reference to Scripture, something more is wanted than mere resemblance. The former must not only resemble the latter, but must have been designed to resemble the latter. It must have been so designed in its original institution. It must have been designed as something preparatory to the latter. The type, as well as the antitype, must have been pre-ordained; and they must have been pre-ordained, as constituent parts of the same general scheme of divine providence. It is this previous design, and this pre-ordained connexion, which constitute the relation of type and antitype. Where these qualities fail, where the previous design and the pre-ordained connexion are wanting, the relation between any two things, however similar in themselves, is not the relation of type to antitype. The existence therefore of that previous design and pre-ordained connexion must be clearly established, before we can have authority for pronouncing on thing the type of another. But we cannot establish the existence of that previous design and pre-ordained connexion, by arguing only from the resemblance of the things compared. For the qualities and circumstances, attendant on one thing, may have a close resemblance with the qualities and circumstances attendant on another thing, and yet the things themselves may be devoid of all connexion. How then, it may be asked, shall we obtain the proof required? By what means shall we determine, in any given instance, that what is alleged as a type was really designed for a type? Now the only possible source of information on this subject is Scripture itself. The only possible means of knowing, that two distant, though similar, historic facts, were so connected in the general scheme of divine Providence, that the one was designed to pre-figure the other, is the authority of that Work, in which the scheme of divine Providence is unfolded. Destitute of that authority, we may confound a resemblance, subsequently observed, with a resemblance pre-ordained: we may mistake a comparison, founded on mere accidental parity of circumstances, for a comparison, founded on a necessary and inherent connexion. There is no other rule, therefore, by which we can distinguish a real from a pretended type, than that of Scripture itself. There are no other possible means, by which we can know, that a previous design, and a pre-ordained connection existed. Whatever persons, or things therefore, recorded in the Old Testament, were expressly declared by Christ, or by his Apostles, to have been designed as pre-figurations of persons or things relations to the New Testament, such persons or things, so recorded in the former, are types of the persons of things, with which they are compared in the latter. But if we assert, that a person or thing, where no such pre-figuration has been declared by divine authority, we make an assertion, for which we neither have, nor can have, the slightest foundation. And even when comparisons are instituted in the New Testament between antecedent and subsequent persons or things, we must be careful to distinguish the examples, where a comparison is instituted merely for the sake of illustration, from the examples, where such a connexion is declare, as exists in the relation of type to its antitype.
The consequences of neglecting the precautions here proposed are sufficiently apparent in the history of typical interpretation. Volumes have been filled with types and antitypes, which exist only in the fancy of the writers. Men of lively imagination are continually at work for the discovery of resemblances, while judgment and erudition are not always at hand, to suggest the differences. Things really discordant are thus supposed to be consonant: and they are united on the ground of similarity, when their difference should have led to a separation. But, when once they are brought together, however fanciful their resemblance, it is but a small additional effort of the imagination, to perceive in the one a symbol of the other. And the things, when thus symbolized, find an easy transition into types and antitypes. Suppose however, that the resemblance between the things themselves would bear the strictest inquiry, yet if the inference be drawn without a proof of previous design and pre-ordained connexion, we may still multiply our types and antitypes without end. Even the self-same type may be provided with various antitypes, according to the different views of the interpreters. For the discovery of types and antitypes is often determined by the religious party, to which the interpreter belongs, or by the peculiar sentiments, which the interpreter entertains. The Cardinal Bellarmine, in his treatise De Laicis, discovered that the secession of the Protestants under Luther was typified by the secession of the Ten Tribes under Jeroboam; while the Lutherans with equal reason retorted, that Jeroboam was a type of the Pope, and that the secession of Israel from Judah typified, not the secession of the Protestants under Luther, but the secession of the Church of Rome from primitive Christianity. But to whichever of the two events the secession under Jeroboam may be supposed the most similar, (if similarity exists there at all beyond the mere act of secession) we have no authority for pronouncing it a type of either. We have no proof of previous design, and of pre-ordained connexion between the subjects of comparison: we have no proof, that the secession of the Israelites under Jeroboam was designed to pre-figure any other secession whatever. This single example is sufficient to shew what abuse may be made of typical interpretation: and, though examples might be easily multiplied, by quotations from various authors, the precautions already given will serve to secure us from error, without further inquiry into the errors of others.
The subject of allegorical and typical interpretation having been thus concluded, our next inquiry must be directed to the interpretation of prophecy. For interpretation of prophecy is so far connected with typical interpretation, as types are prophetic of their antitypes. But the interpretation of prophecy opens such a field of investigation, and involves so many important considerations, that it must be reserved for another season.